


# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An analysis of current international events*



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## **Internal Tensions Weaken West in Contest with East**

With the adoption of the Anglo-American resolution on the "essentials of peace" by all nations in the UN General Assembly with the exception of the Soviet bloc, one might assume that few important sources of conflict remain within the Western group. One might also assume that, if it were not for the intransigence of the Soviet Union, mankind would today be ready to progress in relative harmony toward a brighter and more prosperous "one world." Even "two-world" peace might seem possible if the Kremlin would consent to "live and let live," a plea fervently made by the United States delegate, Warren R. Austin, in the General Assembly on November 30.

Yet as one surveys the events of recent weeks, it is impossible to deny that the Western nations themselves are subject to strains and stresses that threaten the 53-nation unanimity displayed at Flushing Meadow when opposition to Russia was the issue. Complex and difficult problems face us on every continent. Some of these problems are unquestionably the result of the global struggle between East and West. Others are on the periphery, or have no connection with it. But all of them are deeply-rooted in developments that were under way, in most cases, long before Karl Marx wrote *Das Kapital* or Lenin took power in Moscow.

This may seem a truism. Yet there is grave danger to the essentials of peace if Western statesmen, and the citizens they represent, fail to recognize its implications. Professor Arnold Toynbee has pointed out that no major civilization has come to grief because of "murder" by an

external enemy. In each case where a society has disintegrated, he finds, the victim has first fatally weakened himself, the verdict therefore being suicide. The Western world might succeed in temporarily "containing" Russia and communism. But that of itself will not solve most of our current difficulties if we fail to devise constructive and imaginative approaches to new problems. The following summary review of some major areas of world crisis attempts to indicate the challenges facing the West on four continents and the need for reassessing our policies in these areas.

### **Headaches in Europe**

The accord between the three Western powers and the West German state announced on November 24, and the issuance in Paris on December 1 of the North Atlantic Defense Committee's communiqué stating that "unanimous agreement" had been reached on a "strategic concept for the integrated defense of the North Atlantic area," have been hailed in this country as encouraging steps toward the stabilization of Europe and the defeat of the U.S.S.R. in the "cold war." No sooner had these documents been made public, however, than warning signals went up over both the North Atlantic area in general and Germany in particular.

Following the December 1 communiqué, it is expected that military supplies will begin to flow to our North Atlantic partners before the end of the year. Supplies alone, however, are not regarded by the Europeans as a safeguard against military attack by Russia, should such an attack

occur. The continental nations have pointed out that if the Russians, as reported, have 150 divisions, of which 80 at least might be available for use in Western Europe, then the less-than-ten poorly equipped divisions now available on Europe's Atlantic seaboard would prove so inadequate as to be well-nigh useless. European observers are therefore urging that from 40 to 80 divisions be made ready as early as possible for all eventualities.

Until now the United States has not squarely faced the issue of creating a land force in Europe capable of genuine resistance to the Russians. So far as can be determined, Washington strategists have placed their reliance on the expectation that a conflict would take the form largely of air warfare, fought with long-range bombers that would deliver atomic bombs to Russia either from the United States or from bases along the periphery of the U.S.S.R. This type of warfare has aroused little enthusiasm among our European friends, who have feared all along that they would then become the first targets for Russian atomic bombing. President Truman's announcement on September 23 that the Russians have achieved an atomic explosive has accentuated these fears. Of the North Atlantic pact signatories, France alone is capable of putting a substantial land force in the field, but present French forces are estimated at six divisions. If the United States is to give Western Europe a genuine feeling of military security, it will have to provide a substantial portion of the manpower required for an effective land force. This would involve a recasting of the strategic policy so far envisaged here, and

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might create serious problems in Congress and public opinion.

There is, however, another alternative. That is the rearming of Germany which, with a population of 45 million in the Western German state and over 70 million if the German nation were united, could provide adequate, technically trained manpower. While any plans for German rearmament have so far been vehemently denied by Administration spokesmen, there is no question that the issue has received serious consideration. One proposal, designed to placate public opinion here and in Europe, is that we should re-arm Germans, not the German state—that is recruit German soldiers who would be officered and equipped by the Western powers, thereby making it impossible for the German state to become a militarized nation. This proposal, however, has on the whole been coolly received by the Germans who do not seem eager to be put in the position of serving as mercenaries of the West. Whether or not the picture would be altered if there existed a genuine Western European Union, with an integrated army including German troops, is an "iffy" question, since no such union now exists.

Meanwhile, the West German leaders are taking full advantage of this country's determination to oppose Russia and communism by enthusiastically proclaiming their complete agreement with this objective. Since the American Military Government in the four years of occupation made no secret of its distaste for socialism and for the Social Democrats, the rightist groups that are supporting Chancellor Adenauer feel free to go ahead with restoration of the economic structure that existed during the inter-war years and to disregard many of the interests of other groups of the population, including the trade unions and the white-collar workers.

German industrial and financial leaders are also urging renewal of the ties that used to bind French heavy industries with those of Germany, in the hope that American capital, which might not yet be tempted to seek direct investment in Germany, would do so through the intermediary of French banks. This policy has been backed by French Finance Minister Maurice Petsche, who has presented this program to Washington as a genuine attempt to meet ECA Administrator Paul Hoffman's specifications for European "integration."

While it can be argued that before

1939 European cartels did represent an attempt to break through tariff barriers and other restrictions and could serve that purpose again in the future, the United States faces two fundamental questions on this score. First, if we are advocating free private enterprise abroad and implementing it at home with an anti-trust policy, can we acquiesce in the output and price controls devised by private interests in Europe, which in actuality defeat the very concept of free private enterprise? Second, is it a matter of indifference to us whether the industrial resources of the Ruhr will be controlled by the same groups which supported Hitler and, before him, the militarist policy of the Kaiser? Or are we in a position to use such influence as we still retain after the creation of the West German state to urge changes in the economic and social structure of Germany which would assure the German people some say about the use to be made of their country's resources?

### Dilemma in China

This country's failure in its contest with the Soviet Union for Asian leadership has nowhere been so spectacular as in China where the Communists, with the occupation of Chungking on November 30, have, according to newspaper reports, consolidated a larger area of the country under their direct control than was at any time held by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government.

Whatever aid the Russians have given the Chinese Communists, it is clear that the primary source of Communist strength has been the support obtained from large sections of the population, particularly the intellectuals and the peasants. By contrast the Kuomintang has signally failed to retain the support of these groups, as indicated by the increasingly frequent defections of armies and government organs and the abandonment of cities virtually without a struggle.

Two general attitudes have developed in American public opinion about the grave problem this situation poses for us. First, some observers have advocated direct intervention to contain and destroy the new regime and to restore the Nationalists to power. At the very least they have urged that the United States send an armed force to Formosa, as did Senator H. Alexander Smith, Republican of New Jersey, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and an honorary director

of the Foreign Policy Association, on December 1 following his return from a Far Eastern tour. Such action, if successful, would represent a net strategic gain, strengthening our chain of Pacific defenses. But what would be its political consequences on the mainland?

The Chinese Communist leaders, under the influence of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrines, have been telling the Chinese people that the United States, as a "capitalist-imperialist" power, must intervene in China's affairs and must trade in China to prevent internal collapse and revolution at home. Would American military action in Formosa confirm these doctrines and further strengthen the grip of the pro-Russian leaders, not only in China but throughout Asia? The Formosans, whose well-developed industrial economy has been disorganized and sapped by one of the most ruthless carpet-bagging operations in modern times, are already groaning under the weight of a refugee Kuomintang bureaucracy and army. Formosa itself, therefore, is a powder keg which American intervention might well explode.

Other Americans have urged a program which, recognizing the overwhelming character of the revolutionary transformation now flooding Asia, would offer a creative American leadership in place of the Russian guidance which may otherwise triumph. The strongest force in this revolutionary transformation is nationalism; the second most important is economic progress, particularly industrial development and agrarian reform. Generally speaking, both of these trends coincide with the American tradition and have in large measure been modeled on the American pattern. Paradoxically, however, the United States today is viewed by many Asians as the champion of colonialism and reaction.

The positive leadership of the United States in granting independence to the Philippine Islands and assisting at the birth of the United States of Indonesia have helped to counteract this view, and the Administration does not at present appear committed to the military approach. Henry P. Van Dusen, president of Union Theological Seminary, pointed out in the November 14 issue of *Christianity and Crisis*, "There is no hope of halting the Communization of Asia unless the initiative of revolution be wrested from Moscow, and the United States establish its rightful role as champion and sustainer of

independence, self-determination and self-realization for every yearning Asian people."

To regain such a role the United States might seek first, by strict non-intervention, to disprove the assumptions of the Communists. Then China's need for American trade, and especially for industrial goods, may create the conditions for an easing of tension and for recognition of the new regime in which at least the minimum essentials of international intercourse could be safeguarded. Meanwhile the struggle for leadership—not domination—in the rest of Asia has not yet been lost by the United States, but neither has it been won.

### Setbacks in Latin America

The breakdown of representative government in two strategically placed Latin American countries within the space of one month underscores the anti-democratic trend in that region and the need for reconsidering some aspects of United States policy toward Latin America.

The events which gave Panama three presidents within a week and brought about national elections under martial law in Colombia bear about as much resemblance to each other as tropical Panama City does to the mountain fastness of Bogotá. The common denominator in each case, however, is the substitution of force for even the appearance of democracy. This trend began with the "colonels' revolution" in Argentina in the wake of World War II, was accelerated last year with the overthrow of legally constituted reform governments in Peru and Venezuela, and since then has left only Mexico and Brazil unaffected among the major countries of the region.

In Panama, Colonel José Remón, chief of the national police which constitutes the country's only military force, after an unsuccessful attempt to extract a resignation from the constitutional President, Dr. Daniel Chanis, and to impose his own candidate, Vice-President Roberto Chiari, turned to Dr. Arnulfo Arias. President of Panama in 1940-41, Dr. Arias had been considered dangerously pro-Axis in his sympathies and was deposed (with Remón's sanction) in 1941, only to attempt a comeback in the May 1948 elections which proved so nearly successful that a re-count of the ballots was necessary. Arias had spent the intervening years of exile in Argentina where he observed Juan Domingo Perón's rise to power. One of

the principal reasons for the new president's popularity among the poor and ignorant has been his opposition to the 1947 negotiations for extension of United States leases on wartime bases outside the Canal Zone and his attack on the racial and wage discrimination that is still practiced against Panamanian workers in the Canal Zone. Arias now faces two characteristic problems. One is whether he can be more successful than his predecessor in subordinating the police to civilian authority. The second is whether he can retain power without the recognition of the United States which, pending consultation with the other American governments, suspended diplomatic relations with Panama on November 25 because it does not consider the Arias regime a good security risk.

The recognition issue also looms for the new Conservative government in Colombia.\* As forecast, the Liberal party, long the majority party in Colombia, refused to participate in the November 27 elections, which were held under a state of siege with members of the Conservative-controlled armed forces patrolling the polls. The Conservative party leader, Dr. Laureano Gómez, was elected with close to a million votes, reportedly the largest number of ballots ever received by one party in that country's electoral history. Like Arias, Gómez is a controversial figure whom friends describe as desirous of imposing order and "political morality" in Colombia and critics attack as a Falangist. Despite the desire of the Liberal party's Left Wing to resist the new regime, Gómez thus far has been able to maintain order and appears willing to stand by Colombia's international obligations. These have been the essential prerequisites for recognition in recent inter-American practice.

The new army-supported regimes in Panama and Colombia, however, fit into a pattern of "creole fascism" encouraged by Franco's Spain and Salazar's Portugal that is becoming entrenched in Latin America. The United States itself has indirectly helped to create this pattern both by its policy of postponing genuine consultation on pressing economic and social problems in favor of a fictitious political and military "solidarity" in the inter-American system and by its support of the principle of "automatic recognition"

of new governments, regardless of their origins. As early as December 1948 the United States expressed "concern with respect to the overthrow of popularly elected governments by military forces" in Latin America and asked for consultation on this problem among the American republics. The difficulty, however, is that the non-democratic governments now possess a potential ascendancy in the inter-American system. This, together with their combined voting power in the United Nations, places them in a position to exercise what has been described as a "concealed veto" on measures intended to reinforce freedom of the press and information, political party organization, the extension of the franchise and other pre-conditions of Western democracy to which they, although highly vocal defenders of "Western Christian civilization," are essentially opposed.

### Crisis in Africa

Africa is the continent of the future—today poor but rich in potential wealth, relatively tranquil but pregnant with sources of conflict. The question of who is to develop—or "exploit"—Africa was answered in European terms in the late nineteenth century when the continent was partitioned, chiefly as a result of negotiations within the walls of European chancelleries and with little reference to the wishes of native peoples. Now the question has been reopened, and the new candidates for leadership are the residents of Africa, some of them European settlers, some of them immigrants from Asia, but the vast majority of them native peoples only just beginning to be stirred by the call of nationalism. The General Assembly decided that the former Italian colonies, with the exception of Eritrea which is still under study, were to achieve their independence ten years from now. Before this decade runs its course, Africa will have its own Indonesias, Burmas and Indochinas.

Will the Cominform have a hand in shaping the destiny of Africa? By the nature of the Marxist appeal to colonial peoples, it may do so unless the West acts promptly and wisely. And Western actions in recent weeks create doubts about the wisdom of current strategy. On November 28 G. P. Jooste, leader of the South African delegation to the UN, walked out of the Assembly's Trusteeship Committee meeting in protest over the oral hearing which the committee ac-

\*See "Colombian Strike Epitomizes Latin American Crisis," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, November 18, 1949.

corded an Anglican cleric on behalf of the native peoples of Southwest Africa, the League of Nations mandate which the Pretoria government has consistently refused to place under a UN trusteeship. On December 1 Hector McNeil, British Minister of State, developing a position also taken by France and Belgium, denounced the General Assembly's efforts to obtain political information from all non-self-governing territories—outside as well as inside the trusteeship system. On November 26 the governor of Nigeria—now Britain's largest colony with a population of 25 million—declared a state of emergency in the dependency's eastern province following mine-strike violence in which nineteen persons were killed by police while attempting to seize explosives being removed from the government-owned pit.

Each of these incidents is certainly grist for Communist propaganda mills; none of them, however, represents a simple issue of imperialist exploitation. Growing South African intransigence stems from the precarious position of the present Nationalist government. The Nationalists, holding a narrow parliamentary majority, are attempting to strengthen not only the dominance of the European community but also their own role of leadership in that community. Whether outside criticism helps or hinders in such a situation is always an open question. As far as Southwest Africa is concerned, the UN Trusteeship Committee's decision to ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal status of the territory may clarify the issue and, by providing sharper focus for world opinion, bring it nearer to solution.

Britain's leadership of the colonial powers in invoking their sovereignty against the encroachments of the United Nations is not an outright resurgence of imperialism on the part of the Labor government. It represents an effort by the Colonial Office to steer a middle course between its responsibilities to native peoples and the desire of white settlers in Africa, notably in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, to hasten the development of the continent by political and economic unions in East and Central Africa. While the Colonial Office has resisted those as-

pects of the plans which might threaten the paramountcy of native interests in less developed territories, it has been of two minds on the subject, recognizing that African economic advancement will be painfully slow unless Western technology is brought to the continent by additional white settlers.

But perhaps the imminence of the African crisis is best illustrated by the situation in Nigeria. The incident at the government-owned Enugu coal mines, now the subject of an official investigation by a commission of two Britons and two Africans, is only one of several in the midst of discussions about a new constitution for the colony. In July a four-day strike in the Nigerian coal mines appeared to have been politically inspired. Last month a bigger bombshell hit Lagos; it was announced that Dr. Nnando Azikiwe, a militant American-educated nationalist known throughout West Africa as Zik,\* was to lead a delegation of Nigerians to the International Conference on Human Relations at Prague, and from there go on to visit Moscow.

\*On Zik's ideas, see Vernon McKay, "Nationalism in British West Africa," *Foreign Policy Reports*, March 15, 1948.

(In this composite article, the section on Europe was contributed by VERA M. DEAN, the section on China by FRED W. RIGGS, the section on Latin America by OLIVE HOLMES, and the section on Africa by WILLIAM W. WADE.

## News in the Making

**ISRAEL-JORDAN ACCORD?**: With the support of most Latin American and Arab states as well as the Soviet bloc, a sub-committee of the UN General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee voted 9 to 6 on December 1 for the strict internationalization of all Jerusalem. Meanwhile, on-the-spot feelers were reported between Israel and Jordan for agreements in which the two countries would each retain control of areas of the city now occupied by them.

**MEXICAN OIL**: Reports of highly successful drillings at the southern end of the Gulf of Mexico have inspired hopes that Mexico may eventually double its present oil production. At Mexico's initiative, negotiations have been resumed with Washington for a \$200 million loan. These negotiations were abruptly suspended last summer when Mexico refused to accept United States conditions on the ground that they would infringe its sovereignty.

**AFL FOR WORLD LABOR REFORMS**: In a history-making document, the AFL on December 3 urged the United Nations to recognize that the world is on the threshold of a second industrial revolution and to set up some guarantees so that labor will not again be exploited as it was during the first industrial revolution. To achieve this objective, it proposed that the UN Economic and Social Council set the forty-hour week as a world standard which, in the opinion of the AFL, has become attainable because of scientific achievements.

**STRESS ON U.S. IMPORTS**: The State Department and other official spokesmen on foreign economic policy are about to start a drive to educate Congress and the public about the need of increasing United States imports if foreign aid is not to be prolonged. Part of the campaign will be directed at winning approval of American membership in the International Trade Organization at the coming session of Congress. The ITO, still a paper organization chiefly because the United States has not ratified its charter, is regarded by the State Department as the best instrument for spurring world trade.

\*Data taken from printed announcement

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